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INTRODUCTION
A sbestos problems arising from faulty inspections caused New
York City's public schools to open later than planned in the fall
of 1993. In June of 1993, workers repairing the leaky roof of a school
building discovered asbestos, despite written reports that the building
was asbestos-free.' A further, more thorough examination of school
asbestos reports exposed city-wide inadequacies involving gross inac-
curacies, revelations of past warnings, and citations from the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA").2 In August, the School
Construction Authority ("SCA") and the Special Commissioner for
Investigations ("SCI") sealed the offices of the New York City Board
of Education's Environmental Health and Safety Group (formerly
called the Asbestos Task Force),3 alleging that hundreds of reports
were falsified, and thousands of other documents were missing.4 The
internal probe eventually widened to include probes by the EPA, fed-
eral prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Queens
County District Attorney's Office.5 That same month, the Board of
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. Steven Lee Myers, "Misplaced Reliance" Cited On Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1993, at B3.
2. Id. Myers reported a number of pre-1993 incidents. In 1990, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("EPA") notified the New York City Board of Education that it
was not in compliance with asbestos inspection and management provisions. See the
discussion in part III, infra. In 1991, an audit by the Comptroller's Office warned of
inadequacies in the inspections that were performed to comply with federal regula-
tions, and that reinspections would probably be necessary; the Board responded that
it would resurvey buildings when required to do so by the federal government. In
1992, random inspections by the EPA led to citations of the Board of Education for
inadequate compliance. Myers, supra note 1.
3. Sam Dillon, School Asbestos Task Force Cited For History Of Mistakes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Dillon I].
4. Id.
5. Myers, supra note 1; Sam Dillon, Ex-Official Admits Ordering Bogus Asbestos
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at Bl; Kevin Flynn & William Bunch, Lying
Squads? Repair Teams Under Suspicion, NEWSDAY, Aug. 25, 1993, at 3 (The "flying
squads" were employees of the Board of Education's Asbestos Task Force who were
to respond to asbestos projects that were too small to warrant outside contractors.
The Asbestos Task Force offices were located in Long Island City, in Queens County.
The central offices of the Board of Education are located in Kings County (Brook-
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Education ordered that all 1069 schools be retested by a contractor
not involved in the original inspections.6 What started out as a set of
inaccurate reports led to discussions of possible fraud by the original
inspection contractor and officials of the.Asbestos Task Force.7 Par-
ent groups were outraged.8
On September 17, 1993, Advocates for Children, a not-for-profit
agency dealing in children's issues, filed suit against the Board of Edu-
cation and the SCA in the United States District Court for the Eastern
lyn).). On March 24, 1994, Robert Pardi, the person in charge of the Asbestos Task
Force, pleaded guilty to federal conspiracy charges. Mr. Pardi admitted to signing
more than 100 blank inspection forms. No findings of bribery were made. Dillon,
supra, at BI.
6. Edna Negron, Removal May Not Make It, NEWSDAY, Aug. 11, 1993, at 7 [here-
inafter Negron I]. The new contractor was ConTest, and was selected by the Board of
Education. Id. However, it was reported that the SCA's main asbestos contractor was
Kaselaan and D'Angelo, also not connected with the original inspection. William
Bunch, Asbestos Trainers Were Suspended, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 1993, at 8 (prior to
school asbestos controversy, state health officials threatened to withhold course com-
pletion certificates until the Asbestos Tlaining Institute, the company training the new
inspectors, corrected procedures for students not fully understanding English; com-
pany complied within a week).
7. See Dillon I, supra note 3; Negron I, supra note 6; Edna Negron et al., EPA
Probe Too; Feds Study Asbestos" Test, NEWSDAY, 'Aug. 12, 1993, at 7 '[hereinafter
Negron II]. In August, it was reported:
EPA officials want to know if the Board of Education has complied with a
consent order signed by former Schools Chancellor Joseph Fernandez in
February, in which the board agreed to adhere to a host of federal standards
and correct violations in 22 schools. Most of the problems involved record-
keeping. "Depending on what we find, we could fine the Board of Education
or whoever we find to be out of compliance," said Mary Breitenbach, an
EPA spokeswoman. The EPA will examine many of the same records being
studied by special commissioner of investigation Ed Stancik and Thomas
Thacher, inspector general for the School Construction Authority, she said.
Stancik and Thacher are studying possible criminal conflict of interest sur-
rounding the relatively inexperienced consulting firm Envirosafe Corp.,
which won a $1.4-million contract to oversee the Board of Education's as-
bestos testing program in compliance with state and federal law. They also
are scrutinizing the chain of responsibility at the board. Philip Klein, the
attorney for Envirosafe, maintains that it was Board of Education officials,
not company employees, who performed the highly criticized inspections. A
copy of the contract, obtained by New York Newsday yesterday, said that
Envirosafe trained the board inspectors. [The office of the city comptroller
provided a copy of the contract to Newsday. A portion reads:]
Services shall consist of the following:
1. Training 26 Division of School Buildings personnel for certification
through an approved AHERA Asbestos Inspectors course and supervise
(with three Industrial Hygienists) a thorough and complete asbestos survey
of all spaces within each school building in the New York City Board of
Education school system, excluding buildings used for offices ....
5. Assemble a management plan by a certified management planner for
each facility surveyed in accordance with 40 CFR Part 763, including written
identification, sampling analysis results, priority conditions and quantities of
asbestos containing materials within one (1) week of the survey of each facil-
ity as outlined above. Id.
8. Negron I, supra note 6; Negron II, supra note 7.
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District of New York.9 The class-action suit alleged that: first, the
Board of Education failed to adhere to regulations promulgated under
the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act ("AHERA") 10 by
failing to conduct inspections and reinspections properly and by fail-
ing to make its asbestos management plan available to the public;"
second, the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying plaintiffs
information regarding the presence of asbestos-containing material in
the school buildings and the extent and result of the defendants'
cleanup efforts, and by adopting a policy of inspection and reporting
that is contrary to AHERA; 2 and third, the defendants' negligent and
unlawful conduct resulted in exposing the plaintiffs to a variety of as-
bestos-related hazards.' 3 Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring de-
fendants to provide and/or finance the continuous medical monitoring
of their children to ensure early detection and treatment of asbestos-
related disease.' 4 The complaint also alleged that in response to Ad-
vocates for Children's August 24, 1993 request to see the asbestos
management plan for the city's schools under New York's Freedom of
Information Law,'5 the Board of. Education, without providing any
explanation, replied that no plan was available.' 6 The suit is signifi-
cant since it highlights two new aspects of asbestos litigation, faulty
inspections and medical monitoring, which may characterize future as-
bestos litigation.
The concept of awarding damages for medical monitoring costs in
the absence of physical injury was undeveloped at the time of the
AHERA regulations. For example, Askey v. Occidental Chemical
9. Advocates For Children of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., No. CV-93 4269
(E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 1993). The suit also names various private persons as
plaintiffs.
10. Asbestos Hazard 'Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2654 (1988).
The EPA promulgated regulations under AHERA, codified in 40 C.F.R. § 763.
11. Advocates for Children, No. CV-93 4269, at 10-11. See 15 U.S.C. § 2644(d)(5):
"A copy of the management plan shall be available in the administrative offices of the
local educational agency for inspection by the public, including teachers, other school
personnel, and parents. The local educational agency shall notify parent, teacher, and
employee organizations of the availability of such plan." See also 40 C.F.R.
§ 763.93(g)(1), which states, "The management plans shall be available, without cost
or restriction, for inspection by representatives of EPA and the State, the public, in-
cluding teachers, other school personnel and their representatives, and parents." In
addition, 40 C.F.R. § 763.93(g)(3) has a similar requirement for each school.
12. Advocates for Children, No. CV-93 4269, at 11-12.
13. Id. at 12.
14. This is filed as a pendent state law claim for future medical monitoring. Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2649(a): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed, interpreted,
or applied to preempt, displace, or supplant any other State or Federal law, whether
statutory or common." Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) also make clear, in greater
detail, that AHERA is not intended to increase or decrease the liability of persons
under state or federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 2649(b)-(e).
15. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1986).
16. Advocates for Children, No. CV-93 4269, at 10.
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Corp.17 was only a few years old, and it dealt with an extreme situa-
tion. New York's Toxic Tort Revival Statute,' 8 which was designed to
help victims of pollution agents whose damage was not apparent im-
mediately, was enacted only in 1986, the same year as AHERA. Since
AHERA required every public school system in the country to un-
dergo inspections, New York City's experience of asbestos-related
lawsuits may be repeated in other school districts where inspections
were conducted hastily to comply with federal deadlines.
This Note examines this possible new wrinkle in asbestos litigation
from an administrative law standpoint; it argues that the scope of pos-
sible claims for damages is so vast and the expertise needed to review
claims so specialized that AHERA violations need to be resolved by
an administrative agency capable of providing medical monitoring
services either though its own health network or by funding non-
agency providers. An administrative framework for remedies, funded
from an insurance program paid for by school districts and/or the as-
bestos abatement industry itself, is a superior mechanism since asbes-
tos claims already surpass existing resources and cannot be called
upon for this new round of relief.19 School districts are already hard
pressed for resources. Moreover, studies have shown that the costs of
litigation itself are major components that eat away at the resources
available for relief.2 0
A key factor of this proposed administrative framework is a pre-
emption requirement in AHERA that would bar school asbestos med-
ical monitoring claims until the plaintiff had exhausted administrative
remedies available from the agency providing medical monitoring
services. Currently, AHERA does not preempt state laws that relate
to harm caused by asbestos in schools.2 ' Since caselaw involving med-
ical monitoring in the absence of injury is new and Varies considerably
from state to state, school districts may be subjected to varying dam-
ages arising from their compliance with a national program designed
to protect schoolchildren and school employees. The proposed ad-
ministrative framework for relief would also impose more rigorous in-
spection requirements since current regulations are insufficient in
preventing faulty inspections.
Part I of this Note examines the history of asbestos litigation and
school asbestos legislation in particular. Part II discusses consultant
regulations in existing school asbestos regulations and their legal
ramifications. Part III proposes that, through medical monitoring, the
17. 477 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that an action for medical moni-
toring costs is sustainable absent present harm provided plaintiffs, residents of the
Love Canal area, could show that such expenditures were reasonably expected).
18. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1995).
19. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 14 (no preemption in AHERA).
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government can give appropriate compensation for school asbestos
exposure resulting from faulty inspections, and further, that alterna-
tives to lump sum payments, such as periodic payments and service
provision remedies, are appropriate methods of compensation. This
Note concludes by recommending that the EPA use its rulemaking
powers under AHERA to enact stricter inspection regulations and re-
quire school districts to develop medical monitoring mechanisms for
children and school employees in improperly inspected school
buildings.
I. ASBESTOS AND THE LAW
Judging from past and current personal injury litigation arising from
suits filed by asbestos workers, it is likely that a whole body of school
asbestos litigation will arise in the future. The history of litigation by
asbestos workers is an evolving one. Early suits were characterized by
manifested disease, while more recent suits involve medical monitor-
ing for less seriously ill plaintiffs.22 The evolution is significant to
school asbestos since this special field of asbestos litigation will in-
volve plaintiffs with less serious conditions, or even no illnesses, but
who may seek damage awards related to medical monitoring. A his-
tory of asbestos litigation follows.
A. Background on Asbestos Building Material
Asbestos is actually a collective term for a number of naturally oc-
curring fibrous silicate minerals: actinolite, amosite, anthophyllite,
chrysotile, crocidolite, and tremolite.23 The term "asbestos" has also
been applied to mixtures. 24 Asbestos can be easily crumbled or pul-
verized, and, in this form, is called "friable. '25 In the 1950s, asbestos'
22. See Gerardi v. Nuclear Util. Servs., Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1991);
Acevedo v. Consolidated Edison Co., 596 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1993). See also
Roger Parloff, The Tort That Ate The Constitution, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at 75
(discussion of recent asbestos litigants suing for medical monitoring due to "pleural
plaques," an irregularity that has not been linked to any of the asbestos-related dis-
eases, but which requires regular checkups; the condition was found in health screen-
ings sponsored by labor unions after some workers contracted asbestos-related
conditions).
23. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, SAFETY IN THE USE OF ASBESTOS,
71st Sess., Report VI(1) at 3 (1985) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFER-
ENCE]. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2642(3) (1992).
24. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 42. See also 15
U.S.C. § 2642(4): "The term 'asbestos-containing material,' means any material
which contains more than 1 percent asbestos by weight."
25. OFFICE OF TESTING AND EVALUATION & OFFICE OF PESTICIDES AND Toxic
SUBSTANCES, EPA SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR PROPOSED RULE ON FRIABLE ASBES-
TOS CONTAINING MATERIALS IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS 2 (1980) [hereinafter SUPPORT
DOCUMENT]. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2642(6):
The term "friable asbestos-containing material" means any asbestos-contain-
ing material applied on ceiling, walls, structural members, piping, duct work,
or any other part of a building which when dry may be crumbled, pulverized,
1994]
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fireproof qualities and light weight led to its replacement of concrete
as a protective material for steel in large buildings.26 A 1980 study by
the Battelle Memorial Institute showed that amosite and chrysotile
were the most common asbestos minerals in school buildings.27
B. Asbestos and Health
The history of the medical problems" associated with asbestos in
general, and with asbestos in schools in particular, is worth a brief
review. Asbestos-related diseases were noted at least as far back as
the first century, 29 when Pliny the Elder (23-79 A.D.) referred to the
"diseases of slaves" who wove asbestos fibers."0 By the 1930s, the
dangers of asbestos were discovered and documented.3 ' However, the
then-known dangers of asbestos-related diseases were limited to as-
bestosis, a lung disorder specifically linked to asbestos exposure. No
other diseases were linked to asbestos-containing materials. It was
not until the 1950s that an association was discovered between asbes-
tos and two additional conditions: lung cancer and mesothelioma, a
rare form of cancer.32 Yet even at that time, only persons who worked
long and closely with asbestos were considered to be at risk for asbes-
tos-related diseases. j ' .
Finally, in the 1970s, short-term asbestos exposure was cited as haz-
ardous.3 3 Danger to building occupants was not recognized until the
or reduced to powder by hand pressure. The term includes non-friable as-
bestos-containing material after such non-friable material becomes damaged
to the extent that when dry it may be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to
powder by hand pressure.
26. SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 25, at 3. During a fire, the steel in a large
building can become soft and endanger the structure unless it is protected by fireproof
material.
27. Id. (citing BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, COLUMBUS LABORATORIES, As-
BESTOS IN SCHOOLS 1 (1980), Washington, D.C.: Survey and Analysis Division, Office
of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Contract
No. 68-01-3858).
28. See James C. Stanley, Note, Asbestos In Schools: The Asbestos Hazard Emer-
gency Response Act and School Asbestos Litigation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1685, 1690
(1987) (describing three conditions: asbestosis, which can result from long-term expo-
sure to high concentrations of asbestos and is characterized by scarring of the lung
tissue; lung cancei, which can occur with lower concentrations and has a typical la-
tency period of 15 to 35 years; mesothelioma, a rare but deadly form of cancer which is
thought to have an even longer latency period but which can result from low-level
exposure to asbestos).
29. THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 8 (1987) (citing B.
CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTs 1 (1986)).
30. Id. at 8 n.24.
31. Id. at 8 (citing P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS IN-
DUSTRY ON TRIAL 97-131 (1985)). The author of this Note remembers his ninth grade
earth science class in 1969 where he was told not to handle the asbestos mineral sam-
ple due to its toxicity.
32. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 3.
33. It was later learned that workers with less than three months employment in
the asbestos industry still had twice the normal mortality rate from lung cancer. Sup-
[Vol. vi
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late 1960s in Paris office buildings,34 where researchers reported a
0.4% "crepitation" rate in the lungs of occupants. 31 The Paris findings
were considered applicable to the United States due to similarities in
building construction.36 Although many occupants of the Paris build-
ings were smokers, smoking was not considered an intervening varia-
ble since the effects of asbestos were not limited to smokers, but also
affected non-smokers. 37
From an administrative law standpoint, the late 1970s was a period
when research circles began to notice a potential public health prob-
lem. Up to that point, the problem of asbestos was viewed as a con-
cern only to those individuals who worked with the material.
C.. Surveys of Asbestos Claims
The 1970s was also a period when asbestos workers began filing suit
against asbestos manufacturers seeking compensation for injuries re-
lated to asbestos exposure. The Institute for Civil Justice conducted a
survey of 513 randomly selected claims closed between January 1980
and August 1982.38 The survey indicated a number of demographic,
occupational, and health characteristics shared by large numbers of
claimants. For example, the average claimant was fifty-seven years
old. Ninety-five percent were male and ninety-five percent were mar-
ried.39 Nearly all claimants were smokers at some time in their lives.4°
Occupationally, thirty-seven percent of claimants were shipyard work-
ers, thirty-five percent were factory workers, and twenty-one percent
were insulation workers.41 Geographically, seventy-one percent were
in five states: California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
PORT DOCUMENT, supra note 25, at 22 (citing H. Seidman et al., Short Term Asbestos
Work Exposure and Long-Term Observation, ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 330: 61-89
(1979)).
34. In 1969, it was noted that spraying asbestos, onto steel girders, a common
method of applying asbestos, created a friable asbestos coating and released asbestos
fibers. Id. at 15 (citing J.C. Byrom et al., A Dust Survey Carried Out in Buildings
Incorporating Asbestos-Based Materials In Their Construction,, ANN. Occ. HYGIENE
12: 141-45 (1969)). However, it was not until later that such fibers were identified as
hazardous. Id. at 41 (citing L. Awad et al., An Attempt to determine a medium-term,
low-dose exposure indicator based on clinical and radiological lung modifications. Pa-
per presented at the symposium on the Biological Effects of Mineral Fibres held on
25-27 September 1979).
35. Id. at 41. The rate should be looked upon as a prevalence rate; 0.4% of occu-
pants showed evidence of damage to the lungs.
36. Id. at 68.
37. Id. at 45-48. Some believed asbestos only affected smokers and did not cause
lung cancer in non-smokers. However, about 10% of lung cancer cases were deter-
mined to be caused by asbestos alone. Id.
38. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSA-
TION AND EXPENSES at v (1984).
39. Id. at vi.
40. Id. at vi-vii.
41. Id. at vii.
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and Texas.42 By claim, seventy-six percent of plaintiffs alleged dam-
ages arising from asbestosis, twelve percent from lung cancer, and five
percent from mesothelioma. Ninety-six percent of claimants mani-
fested injury.4 3 Fifteen percent of claimants were deceased at the time
of case closure."
A survey by the Federal Judicial Center also showed a concentra-
tion of claims.45 One concentration occurred around shipyard cities:
Boston, Philadelphia and the San Francisco-Oakland area.46 A sec-
ond cluster occurred around asbestos plant cities such as Tyler, Texas,
and Manville, New Jersey.47 A total of 20,837 claims were filed in
federal courts between July 1, 1977 and June 30, 1986.48 Significantly,
only 1133 claims were filed in federal courts of the Second Circuit,
1023 of which were in Connecticut.49 New York, despite its significant
industrial base and shipyard activity during World War II, had rela-
tively few asbestos-related claims.
In the mid-1980s, follow-up surveys of early asbestos litigation out-
comes were conducted. One questionnaire survey on settlements
conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice revealed that the average
settlement was $64,000, and varied by disease: $54,000 for asbestosis,
$83,000 for lung cancer, and $265,000 for mesothelioma. The survey
also revealed that the average defense expense was $37,000, seventy-
eight percent of which was composed of fees and related professional
items, which might have been split among defendants.5' According to
the survey, nine percent of claimants* received no compensation.52
Survey estimates revealed that plaintiffs received less than forty per-
cent of all expenditures related to the claim, which included plaintiff's
compensation, plaintiff's legal fees, and defendant's legal fees and
expenses. 53
Importantly, the survey by the Federal Judicial Center indicated
that only three percent of claims went to trial. 4 The Center found
that so-called "Wellington" settlements averaged higher: $72,000.55
Wellington settlements are those settlements connected with the Wel-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. WILLGING, supra note 29.
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 14-15.
49. Id. at 14.
50. KAKALIK, supra note 38; WILLGING, supra note 29.
51. KAKALIK, supra note 38, at xii.
52. Id. at xi.
53. Id. at 91. Plaintiff received $1 out of every $2.59 spent in the case; the other
$1.59 went to plaintiff's legal fees ($0.64) and defendant's legal fees and expenses
($0.95).
54. WILLGING, supra note 29, at 25.
55. Id. at 22 n.58.
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lington facility, a private arrangement developed by Dean Wellington,
then of Yale Law School. Under the arrangement, large numbers of
asbestos claims were consolidated, and asbestos manufacturers
dropped cross-claims against each other and consolidated defense
counsel. The practical effects of the Wellington arrangement were
that defense costs were reduced and settlement negotiating power
shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant. The Center's finding of
higher Wellington settlements could be explained by the later date of
its survey, 1986, four years after the questionnaire study conducted by
the Institute for Civil Justice. Indeed, inflation over four years could
easily account for the 12.5% increase from $64,000 to $72,000, rather
than any strategic or legal advantage to the plaintiff by using the Wel-
lington arrangement.
The volume of asbestos litigation has grown steadily since the early
1980s. By 1990, 30,401 cases were pending in federal courts and twice
that number were pending in state courts-a total of over 90,000
cases.56 A different survey of state courts estimated that as many as
129,000 state court cases were pending, for a grand total of 160,000
cases.5 7 Projections based on exposure estimated another 668,363 per-
sonal injury cases will be filed from 1990 to 2049.58 With one-third of
school buildings reporting asbestos, the number of property damage
cases from school buildings and public buildings can number in the
thousands.
Significantly, the economic costs to defendants have been so stag-
gering that they have raised concerns over the availability of relief.
Out of twenty-five asbestos manufacturers, up to sixteen have filed
bankruptcy petitions.59 Potential liabilities of $7 billion exist, to be
paid from an interpleader trust fund arrangement valued at only $2.6
billion. To date, there are already 192,347 claims, valued at $13,517
per claim.61 One result is that early claimants have received compen-
sation while later claimants, a group which may include schoolchildren
56. Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1394 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos Litig., Report to the Chief Justice of
the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Mar.
1991), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP., Mar. 14, 1991, at 22,698, 22,702-03 [herein-
after Ad Hoc Comm. Report]).
57. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (citing State Judges Asbestos Litig. Comm., Megatorts:
The Lessons of Asbestos Litigation (July 21, 1992), reprinted in MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.-ASBESTOS, Nov. 20, 1992, at B-1 [hereinafter State Judges Asbestos Litig.
Comm.]).
58. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (citing Eric Stallard & Kenneth Manton, Estimates and
Projections of Asbestos-Related Mesothelioma and Exposures Among Manville Per-
sonal Injury Settlement Trust Claimants, 1990-2049, at 42 (Draft Nov. 9, 1992)).
59. Originally, 11 companies were estimated to be in bankruptcy, but subsequent
reports increased the number to 16. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (citing Ad Hoc Comm.
Report, supra note 56, at 22,705; State Judges Asbestos Litig. Comm. supra note 57, at
B-2; Don J. DeBenedictis, Model for Asbestos Settlements, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1993, at 22).
60. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
710, 754 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on procedural grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1994]
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(assuming an adult mesothelioma victim can show a causal link to
school asbestos exposure) and school employees (who may be able to
show a stronger causal link), may very well be unable to obtain
relief.61
These surveys are important since they provide a backdrop against
which one can analyze the potential scope of school asbestos litiga-
tion. While schoolchildren are far less likely 'to be at risk than asbes-
tos workers, their numbers are much higher, and, as shown in the
following section, mesothelioma (the disease with the highest damages
award) is the disease they are most likely to contract. These surveys
also show that there are two crises that conventional common law tort
procedures will be unable to ameliorate: a public health problem and
a problem of inadequate and inequitable relief. Accordingly, a com-
prehensive administrative approach would need to address both
problems.
The volume of asbestos-related cases in some courts led those
courts to pursue resolution methods reminiscent of administrative
agencies. For example, as a way to manage large numbers of civil liti-
gation cases, courts used techniques such as shifting asbestos cases to
one judge who would develop expertise in the area, using computers
to process data on large numbers of cases to guide in settlements, and
participating actively in settlements.62 These techniques show that an
administrative approach was already being used in the area of asbes-
tos litigation under the guise of the judicial process. A formal admin-
istrative process would offer the advantage of an ongoing, uniform
process that would be used throughout the United States.
Such an administrative arrangement has been developed for
processing a large number of cases and may be developed for arrang-
ing relief, albeit on a private basis. 63 In 1988, twenty of the most fi-
nancially sound asbestos companies formed the Center for Claims
1992)); Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1394 (citing Stefan Fatsis, Lower Sums for Victims of Asbestos,
quoted in PHILADELPHIA INOUIRER, Mar. 18, 1992, at C8).
61. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1398 (Weis, J., dissenting) (discussing a state court's refusal to
cap punitive damages) (citation omitted). In Dunn, the circuit court, although al-
lowing a reduced punitive damages award, admonished district courts to, "consider
whether the financial status of the defendant is such that future claimants will be
unable to collect even compensatory damages because of the limited pool of re-
sources available." Id. at 1390.
62. WILLGING, supra note 29, at 33.
63. Wayne Wooley, Asbestos Hearing To Begin; Massive Settlement Draws Criti-
cism, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, AP, Feb. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File. For a longer and more detailed discussion of the consolidation of
asbestos suits and the use of preestablished criteria to give relief rather than litigation,
see Parloff, supra note 22, at 75 (describing the proposed private settlement arrange-
ment, nicknamed "Georgine" after Robert Georgine, president of the Building and
Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, and the plaintiff in Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., C.A. No. 93-0215, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4659 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
30, 1994)).
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Resolution ("CCR") and settled over 20,000 claims in the first year.64
In July 1991, the federal Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred 26,639 cases in eighty-seven district courts to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.65 Thousands of other state cases also have
been consolidated, such as West Virginia Mass Trial Number 3 which
involves 11,000 claimants.'
In the consolidated trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a
private proposal for relief involving the CCR, nicknamed "Georgine,"
has been approved.67 When originally proposed, Georgine created a
controversy among constitutional and legal ethics scholars68 since they
perceived Georgine as requiring judicial performance of legislative
and administrative functions. Under Georgine, claims are to be evalu-
ated by a panel, and damages are to be awarded based on diagnosis
and other factors. The arrangement also received a mixed reception
from unions and victims' groups. 69 Particularly controversial is the
proposal that the Georgine arrangement apply to future claimants
who are not among the consolidated cases. Other concerns include
possible bias by the attorneys who developed Georgine and their pos-
sible temptation by huge attorneys' fee awards, the restriction on the
ability of claimants with non-malignancies to reenter the tort system,
and whether the arrangement is adequately funded.70
Although the Georgine arrangement is controversial as a tool in
traditional asbestos litigation, it may nevertheless provide a useful
model for school asbestos cases. The history and details of the school
asbestos situation need to be reviewed before considering applying a
Georgine arrangement. School asbestos litigation presents a poten-
tially different type of claimant, one who may experience a much
longer latency period before harm can be discovered, and one who
requires a different type of relief: medical monitoring in the absence
of physical harm.
D. School Asbestos Gains Attention
Experts believe that the susceptibility of children to asbestos-
related diseases is higher than that of adults since children have higher
respiratory and metabolic rates as well as lower body weights.71 The
EPA conducted a survey in 1979 indicating that about one-third of
schools had friable asbestos-containing materials to which about
3,000,000 children and 250,000 staff (including 21,600 custodians and
64. Parloff, supra note 22, at 76.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 75.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 77-78.
71. SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 25, at 51-52.
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maintenance workers) were exposed.72 However, the total number of
persons at risk for premature death due to asbestos was estimated to
be between 111 and 5868 students (with 960 being the "most reason-
able estimate" for the number of children subject to premature
death), 16 to 814 teachers and administrative staff (with 142 being the
most reasonable), and 2 to 84 custodians (with 15 being the most rea-
sonable) .73 Compared to the thousands of asbestos claims filed by as-
bestos workers, the number of potential school asbestos victims was
small; one study reported that the probability of premature death was
comparable to the probability of being struck by lightning.74
Despite the low probability of premature death, the severity of the
disease in children could not be ignored since the most severe asbes-
tos-related disease was the one disease linked to children with low
exposure. This disease, mesothelioma, received the most attention
from school authorities.75 While rare, the disease has a long latency
period and often does not show up until the victim is in his or her
sixties or seventies.76 It is incurable and fatal. Worst of all, it showed
72. Id. at 1. "Exposed" simply meant that the person or persons occupied a build-
ing where asbestos was discovered. The person did not necessarily come anywhere
near the source of friable asbestos.
73. Id. at 91. No effort was made to quantify loss in quality of life, such as reduced
activity or medical costs, due to diagnosis or loss of function in persons who may not
know of their condition. Nor was an effort made to compare the cost of asbestos
abatement with the number of persons at risk of premature death to arrive at a per
person cost. For example, some estimates put the cost of abatement for schools at $3
billion. See Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1990, 20 U.S.C. § 4011 (Supp.
IV 1992) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 4011 (1988)). This would result in a cost of almost $3
million per person (using the "most reasonable estimates"), a figure that far exceeds
the average settlements for asbestos workers with proven injuries. In fact, if the
"most reasonable estimates" for premature death are used, and if claims are settled at
$265,000 (the mesothelioma settlement average), total settlement costs would be less
than one-tenth of the total estimated asbestos abatement cost. It should be noted that
school buildings can last 50 years or more. SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 25, at 14.
The figures of 3,000,000 children and 250,000 employees were based on estimates of
the number of then-existing persons using buildings with asbestos and who were ex-
pected to be in such buildings long enough to be exposed. Id. Note that it did not
count the number of persons who would use the buildings over the course of the
buildings' life spans; this figure includes generations of students and staff, eventually
including (logically) one-third of the general population, assuming that one-third of
all schools have friable asbestos, and all persons attend school. When this additional
fact is considered, the number of potential premature deaths increases, and the cost of
abatement per person decreases, approaching costs similar to the abatement process.
The SUPPORT DOCUMENT was also criticized for overstating the danger of school as-
bestos. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A Di-
LEMMA 2 (1982) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. However, cases of mesothelioma were
documented in persons living a mile from asbestos factories. SUPPORT DOCUMENT,
supra note 25, at 26.
74. New York City Department of Health, Asbestos: Common Questions, CITY
HEALTH INFORMATION, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 1 (citation omitted).
75. KRISTIN OLSON, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ASBESTOS ABATEMENT: RESPONSES To
THE THREAT OF ASBESTOS CONTAINING MATERIALS IN SCHOOL BUILDINGS 2 (1986).
76. Id.
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up in spouses and children of asbestos workers and was traced to
short-term exposures received by casual, short-term contact with as-
bestos particles on the workers' clothing.77 Thus, the dangers associ-
ated with short-term exposure which may occur in building
renovations or in inadequately maintained structures, became known.
Moreover, since no "safe" level of asbestos exists, the mere presence
of asbestos became a source of concern.78
1. The States Respond
A number of states acted without waiting for federal legislation.79
Michigan's State Bureau of Environmental and Occupational Health
began a two-year pilot study in two school districts in 1976, but did not
enact legislation. 81 In January 1977, after asbestos hazards were dis-
covered in Howell Township, New Jersey, New Jersey's Department
of Education asked all school districts to inspect for asbestos and re-
port findings to the Department. 81 As a result, approximately 250
New Jersey school districts reported finding asbestos.8 2 New Jersey's
Department of Health became involved and established a task force
in 1977 to develop minimum specifications for asbestos removal
before disbanding in 1979.83 In 1980, New Jersey developed an asbes-
tos control program in the Department of Health without formal leg-
islation. 4 In 1977, Massachusetts enacted legislation and created a
specialized commission to develop policies and procedures for ad-
ministering a statewide program of school asbestos management.8 5
77. WILLGING, supra note 29, at 5 n.9 (citing B. CASTLEMAN, supra note 29, at 98-
103). See supra note 73 and accompanying text (cases of mesothelioma documented
in persons living a mile from asbestos factories).
78. Although the New York State law and AHERA mentioned the lack of a
"safe" level of asbestos, AHERA allows maximum ambient interior concentrations of
.003 fibers per cubic centimeter (as detected by scanning electron microscopy) and
.005 fibers per cubic centimeter (as detected by transmission electron microscopy). 15
U.S.C. § 2644(d)(4)(A), (B). Regulations promulgated under AHERA state that a
level of 70 structures per square millimeter or less (as measured by transmission elec-
tron microscopy) is acceptable after asbestos-containing building material is removed,
encapsulated, or enclosed. 40 C.F.R. § 763.90(i)(4).
79. Then-existing legislation connected with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration did not apply to schools since they were "not businesses affecting
commerce." See GAO STUDY, supra note 73, at 3.
80. Id. at 34.
81. Id. at 34-35.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. at 34-35.
84. Id. at 35.
85. Id. at 33; see also SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 25, at 12 (Massachusetts
established the Special Commission on Asbestos in Schools and Public Buildings).
For an update, see Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 276-77 (1st Cir.
1990):
In 1975 the Massachusetts Legislature created a commission to assess the
public health hazard of asbestos exposure in schools and public buildings
and to investigate and prevent exposure to workers. 1975 Mass. Acts 58.
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The state discovered that twelve percent of its school buildings con-
tained friable asbestos.86 The New York state legislature also pre-
dated the federal legislation in this area with the "School Asbestos
Safety Act of Nineteen Hundred Seventy-Nine," 87 which cited the
concerns of its time:
•1. The legislature finds that:
(a) substantial amounts of asbestos materials were used
throughout school buildings during the period from
nineteen hundred forty-six to nineteen hundred seventy-
two for fireproofing, soundproofing, decorative and other
purposes;
(b) in industrial use, exposure to asbestos fibers and particles in
the air over a long period of time has been linked by repu-
table medical and scientific authorities to a significant in-
crease in the incidence of diseases, such as asbestosis,
bronchogenic carcinoma, mesothelioma and other
malignancies;
(c) precise scientific data as to the levels at which asbestos
materials constitute a hazard to health in non-occupational '
settings is not yet available and may not be available for
many years to come because of the long period of time
which elapses between the onset of exposure and the ap-
pearance of clinically detectable illnesses; however,
mesothelioma has been found among individuals exposed to
asbestos in some non-occupational settings;
(d) the presence of asbestos in the air in concentrations far ex-
ceeding the normal ambient levels has been found in
,schools, especially where the asbestos materials have
reached a damaged, deteriorated or disturbed state as a re-
sult of abuse, abrasion, water leakage or forced air circula-
tion; and
(e) in view of the fact that New York state has compulsory at-
tendance laws for children of school age and these children
must be educated in a safe and healthy environment, the
presence and condition of asbestos in the schools is of spe-
cial concern to the legislature. 8
Subsections 1(c) and 1(d) focus on the particular concerns of school
authorities: lack of specific knowledge about the level of risk to
The Commonwealth's Department of Labor and Industries gradually as-
sumed the duties of the Asbestos Commission and" in 1987, at the direction
of the Massachusetts Legislature, the Department promulgated the detailed
regulations [related to asbestos, handler training requirements] challenged
here. See Mass. Regs. Code tit. 453, §§ 6.00-6.17, 6.91-6.93.
86. SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 25, at 12.
87. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 430-436 (McKinney 1986), repealed by § 437 (1991).
88. Id. § 431(1), "Statement of legislative findings and purposes." Section 431(e)
identifies a duty to provide a safe and healthy environment for children. Such a duty
was identified as a common-law duty in City of New York v. Keene Corp., 505
N.Y.S.2d 782, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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schoolchildren's health but a general awareness that a risk is present
and is significantly higher in buildings with poor maintenance. 89 Sub-
sequently, a follow-up study of school asbestos conducted by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office ("GAO") indicated that the inspection of New
York City facilities was thorough.' By 1982, all New York City
schools had been inspected and, of 259 school buildings reporting as-
bestos, 197 had been abated.91 New York had a policy of zero toler-
ance of asbestos, while other school districts had priority rating
systems. 92 Thus, a public health problem had also become a problem
of uneven standards and enforcement.
2. Early Federal Measures
The GAO was less kind in its evaluation of the federal measures
developed in the early 1980s. These measures amounted to: (1) the
Toxic Substance Control Act, which created a technical assistance pro-
gram run by the EPA and contained a 1982 mandate to schools to
conduct inspections and, significantly, to inform parent and teacher
groups of the presence of asbestos;9 3 and (2) the Asbestos School
Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980,91 which charged the De-
partment of Education with administering a program of financial
assistance to states, record-keeping, establishing an informational pro-
gram, and reviewing and revising EPA guidelines on when asbestos in
schools could be termed hazardous.95 The GAO study indicated that,
while the EPA technical assistance program had at least some limited
success, the Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act ac-
complished little; no loans or grants Were available, and asbestos haz-
ard criteria were still lacking.96 In addition, the GAO study expressed
89. The link between asbestos and "deferred maintenance" in current times may
be under scrutiny. In the summer of 1994, Justice Schackman ruled that a suit by the
United Federation of Teachers, against the City of New York to compel proper build-
ing inspections could proceed. Daniel Wise, Judge Permits Lawsuit Over School Con-
ditions, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1994, at 1.
90. GAO STUDY, supra note 73, at 12-13, 35-36. The GAO contacted the State of
New York as well as school districts with jurisdiction over public schools in New York
City, Buffalo, and Rochester.
91. Id. at 15.
92. Id. These priority systems were developed so that more serious abatement
projects could be implemented earlier.
93. Id. at i. The EPA did issue a document to help school districts, "Guidance for
Controlling Asbestos-Containing Material in Buildings," but this was not considered
adequate. See 15 U.S.C. § 2641(a)(3), which states, "The guidance provided by the
Environmental Protection Agency in its 'Guidance for Controlling Asbestos-Contain-
ing Material in Buildings' is insufficient in detail to ensure adequate responses."
94. Pub. L. 96-270, 94 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3611
(1988)).
95. GAO STUDY, supra note 73, at i. See also 20 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988). Note how
the placement of this law under Title 20 puts this statute in Education, and not under
Title 15, the Trade and Commerce area, where the Toxic Substances and Control Act
is placed.
96. GAO STUDY, supra note 73, at ii-iii.
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concern over the quality of inspections being conducted under the
state and federal programs, since asbestos was still being found in
buildings after inspections had been conducted.97
In 1984, a federal funding system was initiated,98 which was subse-
quently revised in 1990. The 1990 revision transferred administration
of the Act from the Department of Education to the EPA.99 Impor-
tantly, the updated legislation indicated that the original figure of
three million children endangered by asbestos had increased to fifteen
million.1°°
3. New York City's Inspections Under AHERA
In 1986, Congress enacted AHERA. 11 In 1988, pursuant to
AHERA, New York City undertook an inspection of its school facili-
ties.102 AHERA mandated that every school district appoint an indi-
vidual to oversee a complete inventory of asbestos in school buildings
and to develop a plan for the elimination of hazards.0 3 The EPA was
required to develop regulations, which were promulgated in 1987.1'
The EPA approved certain training programs for new inspectors. °5
Essentially, the three major goals of AHERA were to: (1) establish
Federal regulations requiring inspections for asbestos-containing ma-
terial, (2) mandate reinspection where appropriate, and (3) require
the EPA to study the extent of the asbestos danger. 10 6 Under
AHERA, every "local educational agency" was to develop a detailed
asbestos management plan for its school buildings. The plan must in-
clude results of inspections, a plan for reinspection (due to wear and
tear that may expose additional asbestos problems), and the identifi-
cation of laboratories and consultants involved in the inspection.
97. Id. at 13.
98. Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat.
1287 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4022 (1988)).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 4011 (Supp. IV 1992) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 4011 (1988)).
100. Id. The 15,000,000 figure was also used in OLSON, supra note 75, at 2 n.15
(citing Fay A. Silas, Asbestos-Free: Schools, Others Sue Companies, 71 A.B.A.J. 22
(1985)).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 2641.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2641. See also Sam Dillon, Confusion Ruled First Tests for Asbes-
tos, Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at B1 (describing the testing process in
response to federal regulations) [hereinafter Dillon II].
103. 15 U.S.C. § 2643(i)(F). See also 40 C.F.R. § 763.84(g)(1). Note that AHERA
did not specify eliminating asbestos itself; it merely required eliminating the hazard of
asbestos. A number of alternatives complied with this requirement, such as closing
off an area.
104. 40 C.F.R. § 763(E), app. C.
105. Id. The EPA approved a five-day training program for New York City. Dillon
II, supra note 102, at 1. The program consisted of three days of instruction on sam-
pling techniques and two days on asbestos management. Id. The program appeared
to be similar to other school inspection programs offered around the country at the
time.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 2641(b).
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AHERA set a deadline of 540 days from October 22, 1986 for inspec-
tions, °7 and of May 9, 1989 for management plans to be submitted to
state governors.10 8 The statute specifically required that the plan be
available to the public.10 9
Under AHERA, only accredited inspectors can conduct inspec-
tions, prepare management plans, and conduct response actions.110
Persons could be accredited either through a state accreditation pro-
gram"' or through an EPA-approved series of courses and examina-
tions.'12 AHERA was modified slightly in 1990 to extend the
accreditation requirement to those inspecting public buildings." 3 The
EPA was directed to publish a list of EPA-approved asbestos training
courses, 114 and was empowered to assess civil penalties of not more
than $5000 per day if local educational agencies failed to comply with
inspection requirements." 5 No person could be retaliated against in
any manner, including job dismissal, for revealing potential violations
to any other person." 6
One underlying theme in AHERA is the high degree of citizen par-
ticipation. "Any person" may petition the EPA to initiate a proceed-
ing. 17 Moreover, "any person" can commence a civil action to
compel the EPA to meet its deadlines for developing regulations."
8
Public availability of the asbestos management plan developed by a
107. 15 U.S.C. § 2644(b)(1). The due date would be approximately April 1988.
108. This date was set up as the latest date if a school district qualified for deferral.
The original deadline was 720 days from October 22, 1986 (approximately November
1, 1988). See 15 U.S.C. § 2645(a), (d).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2643(i)(5), 2644(d)(5).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 2646(a).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 2646(b). The EPA was to develop a model accreditation program.
New York State and New York City have regulations that parallel the EPA regula-
tions provided in 40 C.F.R. § 763(E), app. C.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2646(c).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 2646(a)(1), (3), (b)(1)(A)(i), (iii) (Supp. V 1993).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 2646(f). The Administrator was to publish a list of EPA-approved
asbestos training courses every three months in the Federal Register until August 31,
1991. After that date, the Administrator could do so whenever it "considers it use-
ful." Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(a), (c).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2651(a). While this measure clearly protects custodians and teach-
ers, its broad language also protects anyone, including students and parents, who dis-
closes details about school asbestos to anyone else, including the media. This portion
of the statute provides statutory protection that overrides any state and local employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. This is important since not all jurisdictions may necessarily fol-
low clear public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Admittedly,
since the employees at issue would likely be public employees, a dismissal following
disclosure of facts relating to school asbestos could also involve a constitutional due
process analysis. Although not challenged by caselaw, this subsection indicates that
Congress did intend AHERA to preempt state and local law, in this case employment
law, when it came to school asbestos, despite its general language of not preempting
state laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 2647(g)(3).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(e).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(f).
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school district was expressly provided for in the statute.119 The citizen
participation provision, coupled with the statute's "no preemption"
language,' indicates that Congress conferred statutory standing upon
individuals to act as "private Attorneys General"' 2' who could use the
EPA and the courts to put pressure on school districts. Congress' use
of the term "any person" suggests that it did not intend to limit partic-
ipation in AHERA enforcement to those with "particularized inter-
ests." This notion, however, begins to lose its luster when one
considers the scope of the asbestos problem, the difficulty that school-
children will face in the future when trying to obtain relief, and the
difficulties in school inspection.
New York City's schools were inspected in the early 1980s under a
state program and in the mid-1980s under AHERA. These first two
inspections were inadequate so the schools were inspected a third
time in 1993; over 1000 buildings were inspected over a two-month
period and "certified" as safe. Given the complexity of buildings, the
small number of samples, and the small quantities necessary to comply
with AHERA, it is possible that there will be a fourth inspection of
New York City schools. In the long run, it may be more cost-effective
for the administrative agencies to ,directly focus on identifying asbes-
tos problems in schoolchildren rather than in the buildings they
occupy.
The EPA issued its own asbestos regulations in 1987.122 Portions of
these regulations are particularly relevant to New York City. Section
763.85(b) requires reinspections every three years.'2 3 The language of
the regulation, however, limits reinspection to areas known or as-
sumed to have asbestos-containing material.2 4 Thus, in New York
City's case, new inspections would be based on earlier faulty inspec-
tions, thereby allowing asbestos missed the first time to escape discov-
ery in subsequent inspections.125 Most likely, there will be a fourth
119. 15 U.S.C. § 2644(d)(5).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(g)(3).
121. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting): "[I]ndividual
litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as representatives of
the public interest." (citation omitted). Prof. Schwartz writes that the courts have also
acted to reduce standing requirements. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 500 (3d ed. 1991). In fact, part of the revolution in environmental and consumer
law comes as a result of this change. Id. at 496.
122. 40 C.F.R. § .763.
123. 40 C.F.R. § 763.85(b)(1).
124. 40 C.F.R. § 763.85(b)(1): "all friable and nonfriable known or assumed ACBM
[asbestos containing building material]." Note that this is not a de novo process.
125. In 1993, workers discovered asbestos in a previously inspected, supposedly as-
bestos-free, New York City school building only by accident. Myers, supra note 1.
Note that 40 C.F.R. § 763.99(a)(3) exempts inspection of a building if "[biased on
sampling records and inspection records, an accredited inspector has determined that
no ACBM is present in the homogeneous or sampling area and the records show that
the area was sampled before December 14, 1987, in substantial compliance with
§ 763.85(a) . . .
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round of inspections, creating additional incentive for a program fo-
cusing on the health of schoolchildren rather than on inspections.
Following AHERA, a number of school districts turned to lawsuits
to finance their abatement projects. These lawsuits were based on
property damage theory rather than on any personal injury theory,
and made no provision for personal injury to schoolchildren.
AHERA has' an express "no preemption" section and does not bar
such litigation.126 However, the asbestos manufacturing industry had
already been subjected to lawsuits from its own workers and did not
have "deep pockets" in this area of litigation.127
4. The New York City Asbestos Problem: Did It Point Out
AHERA's Weaknesses, or Did New York City Have a
Problem Because AHERA Works?
Undoubtedly, the New York City experience highlighted problems
with sampling techniques, a key AHERA regulation area. 28 Many of
the City's school buildings were not only old, but had been renovated
several times. While every building had been inspected in the early
1980s as part of the state program, practical problems existed. For
example, one cannot use one sample of asbestos to extrapolate the
amount of asbestos in an entire building. This is because asbestos
concentrations can vary when used as a bonding agent, such as in plas-
-ter walls and ceilings; concentrations can range from "safe" levels (be-
low one percent asbestos) to unsafe levels within a single stretch of
wall or ceiling.129 Remodeling and renovation magnifies the problem
considerably and. makes multiple sampling more important. 30 More-
over, it is interior areas that are most likely to be renovated. On the
other hand, samples from areas such as roof tiles or boiler insulation
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 2649(a), (e), which state, respectively, as follows:
(a) [No preemption:] Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed, inter-
preted, or applied to preempt, displace, or supplant any other State or Fed-
eral law, whether statutory or common.
(e) [Intent of Congress:] It is not the intent of Congress that this subchapter
or.rules, regulations, or orders issued pursuant to this subchapter be inter-
preted as influencing, in either the plaintiff's or defendant's favor, the dispo-
sition of any civil action for damages relating to asbestos.
127. Stanley, supra note 28, at 1701. AHERA did have a provision for federal
funding, and separate federal funding legislation had been passed. However, most
commentators felt the only significant source of funds would be from damage awards
from litigation.
128. Id. at 1698; Dillon II, supra note 102, at B1.
129. Dillon II, supra note 102, at B1. Note how the one percent mixture is consid-
ered "safe." A better term would be "acceptable" since no medically safe level of
asbestos exists. See CASTLEMAN, supra note 29 -and GAO STUDY, supra note 73;
Stanley, supra note 28, at 1690; N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 430-436 (McKinney 1986), re-
pealed by § 437 (1991).
130. Dillon II, supra note 102, at B1.
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usually yield straightforward, reproducible, reliable results; one sam-
ple can speak for the entire area.13 '
Specifically, EPA regulations require a minimum of seven samples
from any wall, ceiling, or other surface area that is uniform in color
and texture and larger than 5000 square feet.' 32 Seven samples for
6very 5000 square feet are not required; rather, just seven samples of
any "uniform" area greater than 5000 square feet, no matter how
much larger it is. If a school has greater than 300,000 square feet of
wall space, which is not uncommon, it is conceivable that seven sam-
ples could suffice for one school. According to the City's contract
with Envirosafe, the asbestos inspection contractor, an average of
thirty samples were to be taken from each school's building materials
that might contain asbestos. 33 Since Envirosafe was hired early in
1989, and inspections were to be completed by May 1989, the work
entailed considerable overtime and rushed work.' 34
Commentators on AHERA predicted chaos from the beginning.3
The EPA deadline for the nation's 40,000 school districts was
extended to May 9, 1989, since many districts could not obtain qual-
ified inspectors. 36 The program was underfunded, 37 and be-
cause AHERA did not address reforming contractor's liability, 38
potential entrants in the field were discouraged from entering
a highly risky business. Almost overnight, AHERA and similar ear-
lier legislation139 created a multibillion-dollar bonanza for those
who did enter the asbestos abatement field. 140  School districts
131. Id.
132. 40 C.F.R. § 763.86(a)(3).
133. Negron II, supra note 7, at 7.
134. Id.
135. Stanley, supra note 28, at 1686.
136. Id. at 1688 n.22.
137. Id. at 1687.
138. Id. at 1688.
139. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); Asbestos
School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-270, 94 Stat. 487
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3611 (1988)); Asbestos School Hazard
Abatement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-377, tit. 5, 98 Stat. 1287 (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4022 (1988)).
140. Stanley, supra note 28, at 1686 n.4 (citing Leslie Whitaker, Monster in the
Closet, TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 53 (asbestos abatement industry grew in revenue from
$200 million in 1983 to over $2.7 billion in 1988)). The AHERA inspections caused
the clock to begin running on asbestos abatement in some cases. For example, the
Chicago school district lost out on a $500 million claim against its insurance company
since it filed its claim more than 12 months after discovering asbestos in its school
buildings. In granting summary dismissal to the defendant insurer, the court noted
that the school district knew it had an asbestos problem as early as 1978, and even
forgiving that, the school district certainly knew by the 1980 inspections. See Affili-
ated FM Ins. Co. v. Board of Educ., 23 F.3d 1261 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 425
(1994); Michael Booth, $500M Dismissal Affirmed, N.J.L.J., May 23, 1994, at 7.
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were required to appoint someone to be responsible for the inspec-
tions.141
The New York City incident indicates a more thorough reinspection
regulation is needed. Requirements that a minimum number of areas
previously identified as asbestos-free be reinspected would provide
greater confidence in the building's asbestos-free status. Further ac-
tion should be outlined if areas shown to be asbestos-free on the first
inspection turn out to contain friable or non-friable asbestos on the
second inspection.
The history of early school asbestos projects is significant in deter-
mining the underlying rationale for AHERA. The very purpose of
AHERA was to prevent shoddy abatement practices, nicknamed "rip
and skip" by the Second Circuit, which endanger schoolchildren. 42
While the Second Circuit interpreted AHERA's purposes to require
qualified inspectors and "neat" abatement projects, this interpretation
should also be applied to the other aspects of the inspection process,
which is at the heart of the abatement project. In fact, early criticism
of school asbestos programs lay in the preliminary inspection process,
rather than in the subsequent abatement process.143
II. AHERA'S CONSULTANT REGULATIONS
Appendix C to 40 C.F.R. § 763 presented the EPA's Model Con-
tractor Accreditation Plan.'" Under the plan, one can become an in-
spector following a three-day training course. Management planners
follow a separate three-day program, and one who completes the four-
day asbestos abatement contractor and supervisor's training course is
qualified to be an abatement project designer. Asbestos abatement
workers undergo a separate three-day course. Examinations are
required. 145
The consultant regulations were adopted by a number of states in
licensing persons who inspected for asbestos, developed management
141. 40 C.F.R. § 763.84(g). In New York City, that individual was Robert Pardi, an
architect with the Board of Education's division of school buildings. Dillon II, supra
note 102, at 1.
142. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 58 (2d
Cir. 1988).
143. GAO STUDY, supra note 73.
144. 40 C.F.R. § 763(E), app. C. Appendix C outlines curriculum and application
requirements for sponsors wishing to have their courses accredited. Oddly, the regu-
lations do not require minimum course entry requirements such as a high school di-
ploma or English proficiency. However, the regulations do say that individual states
may require a high school diploma. Id.
145. New York State and New York City have parallel requirements. See "Asbes-
tos or Products Containing Asbestos; Licensing," N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 902-905 (Mc-
Kinney 1988); RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, tit. 15, ch. 1, subch. B, pt. 2, §§ 1-16
to 1-23 (covering training courses).
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plans, and did the physical removal work in abatement projects. 46
Companies involved in asbestos abatement projects challenged the
laws, asserting that worker requirements promulgated by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration preempted these, state
laws.' 47 In general, courts have upheld the "public health" portions of
the curriculum (how to recognize asbestos, how to prepare a work
area for minimum dispersion of asbestos fibers) while holding that the
occupational health and safety portions were preempted. These por-
tions generally covered worker medical surveillance requirements or
respiratory protection practices." Thus, it is possible for states to im-
prove upon AHERA's "public health" portion of the curriculum con-
cerning the identification, location, sampling, and evaluation of the
asbestos problem. They will not be preempted by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, and AHERA has an express "no preemption"
clause. In fact, AHERA specifically allows more rigorous state re-
quirements and does so in such broad language 49 that states essen-
tially have a "free hand" in fashioning more stringent requirements
for consultant practices. Furthermore, the 1990 amendments to
AHERA, described in the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of
1990, state that EPA enforcement actions shall not be viewed as "af-
fecting occupational safety and health."' 5 ° Indeed, it would be inter-
esting to see if the decisions in Associated Industries of Massachusetts
v. Snow, Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, and
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian would have al-
146. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The
training curriculum is adopted almost verbatim from a model curriculum developed
by the federal Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency ResponseAct of 1986 (AHERA)") (citation omitted); Environmental En-
capsulating, 855 F.2d at 58 ("AHERA requires training and accreditation - identical
to that of the DEP [New .York City's Department of Environmental Protection] pro-
gram - of individuals working with asbestos in school buildings.") (citation omitted).
More rigorous state laws are allowed under AHERA, see 15 U.S.C. § 2649(c) (state
may establish more requirements), but only a few states have chosen to do so. See
National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 683 (7th Cir. 1990) (Illi-
nois law challenged).
147. Associated Indus., 898 F.2d 274; Environmental Encapsulating Corp., 855 F.2d
48. See generally the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 88 651-678
(1970).
148. National Solid Wastes, 918 F.2d at 683; Associated Indus., 898 F.2d at 283-84;
Environmental Encapsulating, 855 F.2d at 59-61.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2649(c) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed or
interpreted as preempting a State from establishing any additional liability or more
stringent requirements with respect to asbestos in school buildings within such State."
The use of "with respect to" language can open the door to many options by a state.
Certainly more extensive training and sampling technique requirements would be
upheld.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 2646 (note) (Supp. IV 1992): "In exercising any authority under
[AHERA] ... the Administrator of the [EPA] shall not, for the purposes of section 4
(b) (1) of [OSHA] be considered to be exercising statutory authority to prescribe or
enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health."
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lowed a broader application of state standards which "piggybacked"
on the amended AHERA and EPA enforcement authority.
The experience, however, is that AHERA has become the standard,
not the minimum upon which states could develop more appropriate
consultant regulations. Massachusetts and New York; the most ag-
gressive states in this area, eventually adopted AHERA standards
rather than adopting more stringent standards.' 5 ' The Illinois law was
challenged, but its public health portions were upheld since they were
congruent with AHERA. States tend to match the federal programs
precisely because asbestos management is a detailed process requiring
the research and expertise that the states cannot be expected to de-
velop. The states naturally look to the federal government, and more
specifically, to the EPA, for leadership in this area. Essentially, then,
school asbestos management is a federal program with the states "tag-
ging along" for the ride.
This pattern of behavior suggests that preemption of state regula-
tions in the area of school asbestos consultant regulations would not
have a catastrophic effect on state programs. As the asbestos abate-
ment industry matures and the problems in New York City become
better known, the EPA is in the best position to 'objectively evaluate
the situation. It could then take prompt action using -its rulemaking
authority since the AHERA statute does not mandate the content of
consultant regulations. Preemption would serve a useful purpose
since it would allow consultants to be drawn from various states when-
ever a major project is undertaken, such as was the case in New York
City.
States differ in the remedies to which schoolchildren may be enti-
tled because states differ in their approaches to granting awards for
medical monitoring costs in the absence of physical injury. New York
City may well have been an early case of faulty inspections. As more
instances of faulty inspections are discovered, due to the haste of
AHERA inspections, local school boards may find themselves facing
considerable litigation which, like the cases -affected by the Georgine
arrangement, seeks awards to cover medical examinations when no
physical injury has been manifested. As is shown below, AHERA is
flawed by openly permitting parties to raise claims sounding in tort in
both state and federal courts. Its practice of allowing citizens to serve
as "mini-Attorneys General" may backfire by encouraging litigation
for which realistic relief may not be available either due to state law
on medical monitoring awards or a lack of school district resources.
AHERA should be amended to develop a federal program of dispute
resolution and relief to rationalize the problems of school asbestos.
One key feature of school asbestos claims is the young age of claim-
ants at their first exposure. For this reason, any arrangement for relief
151. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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due to faulty school inspections must include accommodation of medi-
cal monitoring in the absence of physical injury. For instance, claim-
ants may develop "pleural plaque" on the lungs, a condition which is
not life-threatening, but involves lifestyle restrictions such as not
smoking, avoiding pollutants and dusty environments, and getting reg-
ular medical examinations. 15 2 Early detection can be important in
avoiding aggravating conditions. Under the Georgine arrangement,
claimants must apply for relief when they get sick or they can get
"green cards" which, in the case of pleural plaque, will extend the
statute of limitations and allow them to reenter the system at a later
date if and when they do get sick. Unions sponsored mass screenings
that detected pleural plaque in union members, and that incidentally
contributed to the growth in asbestos cases. 153
III. MEDICAL MONITORING
A. CERCLA: No Recognition for Medical Monitoring
Awards for medical monitoring in the absence of physical harm
have received mixed treatment in federal courts. No federal appellate
court has decided a case involving medical monitoring costs and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"),'154 nor have any federal courts awarded
medical monitoring costs under CERCLA.55 However, CERCLA
does not ignore the concept of medical monitoring entirely. 5 6 At is-
sue is whether medical monitoring costs are recognized as permissible
response costs in private actions brought under CERCLA.15 7 As a
general rule, federal courts have characterized the costs of medical
monitoring for those exposed to toxic substances as a subset of medi-
cal treatment costs and, thus, recovery under CERCLA has been re-
jected. 58 Some cases have carved out medical monitoring costs from
152. Parloff, supra note 22, at 76.
153. Pleural plaque cases, nicknamed "the pleurals," are now a significant portion
of the cases which started in the 1980s. Parloff, supra note 22, at 76.
154. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
155. Dan A. Tanenbaum, When Does Going To The Doctor Serve The Public
Health? Medical Monitoring Response Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
925, 938-39 (1992). A search conducted in preparation of this Note revealed no
awards involving CERCLA and medical monitoring costs since Tanenbaum's Note.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1) provided for the creation of the Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Registry and provided for the medical care and testing of ex-
posed individuals.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) provides for private recovery actions for contribution
toward "response costs."
158. See Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 901-05 (D. Minn. 1990) (resi-
dents' water supplies polluted by nearby United States Army site; court held that
plaintiffs could not recover medical monitoring costs under CERCLA, but could re-
cover them under common law tort); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 28 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1665, 1669 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (well water contamination); Wehner v. Syntex
Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651, 652-53 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (residents of Times Beach, Missouri
and other "confirmed dioxin sites" suing for medical monitoring expenses and other
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the larger universe of medical treatment and have identified it as a
cost that furthers the goals of CERCLA, since monitoring helps to
gauge the status of the land and the extent of environmental dam-
age.159 These cases analogize medical monitoring to techniques, such
as monitoring wells and periodic sampling, used in monitoring land
contaminated by pollution.
Clearly, the CERCLA cases are important since they illustrate that
a federal law can govern how medical monitoring costs will be
awarded, if at all. Given the high costs of asbestos litigation and the
low probability that late litigants, such as schoolchildren, will have re-
lief available to them, the AHERA statute should be revised to in-
clude an express treatment of medical monitoring costs with a
remedial process.
B. State Caselaw: Recognition of Medical Monitoring in the
Absence of Physical Harm
New York is one of a few jurisdictions which recognizes "medical
monitoring" costs as a set of compensable damages separate and apart
from damages for "increased risk" of harm.160 In Askey, the court
defined medical monitoring costs as those costs associated with
diagnostic procedures that a litigant may reasonably require, and dis-
damages arising from dioxin contamination); Chaplin v. Exxon Co., 25 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2009,2011 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (class action filed by residents and workers against
operators of nearby waste site).
159. See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (former em-
ployees of a capacitor manufacturing plant exposed to toxic substances). However,
even in Brewer, the district court said only that medical monitoring costs were poten-
tially recoverable in private suits since they could be a way of assessing discharges or
public health effects of environmental contamination.
160. For a discussion of this topic, see Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16833 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (federal court using North
Carolina law to decline recognition of a tort damage of medical monitoring, deferring
to the state legislature to recognize such awards, and citing De Stories v. Phoenix, 154
Ariz. 604, 610 (Ct. App. 1987) to identify Arizona as a jurisdiction that does recognize
medical monitoring costs in absence of manifested injury). Cases in other jurisdic-
tions recognizing awards include Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the
Army, 835 F. Supp. 803, 809-13 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (citing belief that state supreme court
will eventually recognize medical monitoring costs, but disallowing costs in the instant
case since plaintiffs did not provide evidence of presence of toxic substances at the
surface where they would have been exposed, and showed no evidence of introduc-
tion of substances into their bodies); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d
795, 821-27 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing medical monitoring costs for persons affected by
waste site if medical monitoring procedures are "reasonably certain," but also recog-
nizing the comparative fault of plaintiffs who are smokers); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 978 (Utah 1993) (renovation workers exposed to asbestos);
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 314 (N.J. 1987) (residents' well water
contaminated by toxic pollutants from township's landfill); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765
S.W.2d 42, 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (residents exposed to toxic chemicals from plant).
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tinguished these costs from "increased, risk" damages, which are
speculative. 16 1
Addressing the subject of testing individuals, the Askey court indi-
cated that, "[a]lthough damages resulting from enhanced risk of can-
cer and the threat of future harm not yet realized are not compensable
in a tort action.., there is a basis in law to sustain a claim for medical
monitoring as an element of consequential damage . . . ."' Such
claims are not easy ones to maintain. The Askey court added:
Consequences which are contingent, speculative, or merely possible
are not properly considered in ascertaining damages .... The future
expense of medical monitoring could be a recoverable consequent-,
ial damage provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that such expenditures are "reasonably
anticipated" to be incurred by reason of their exposure. There is no
doubt that such a remedy would permit the early detection and
treatment of maladies and that as a matter of public policy the tort-
feasor should bear its CoSt.1 6 3
In the ten years following Askey, subsequent. New York cases have
upheld Askey's principles and the recoupment of medical monitoring
costs, but have also demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining awards.
In Gerardi,'6 the trial court interpreted Askey to require expert testi-
mony establishing that medical monitoring costs will be incurred. 65
The Gerardi court, however, extended Askey further and allowed an
award for negligent infliction of emotional distress, not for fear of pos-
sible future disease, but rather for emotional distress tied to the need
for medical monitoring. 66
More recently, the issue of medical monitoring and workers' com-
pensation has been addressed. In Acevedo v. Consolidated Edison
Co. ,167 workers were dispatched to an explosion site where two other
workers had been killed. They were not warned that friable asbestos
fibers had been released into the air from insulating material. 68 Not-
ing that neither party indicated whether the plaintiff-workers were eli-
161. Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984).
Askey was a suit by residents of the Love Canal area who demanded compensation
for medical tests they were advised to undergo as a result of living in a contaminated
area. In the earlier Love Canal case, a settlement was reached which provided for a
testing and monitoring program for the site, but not for the people living in the area.
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y.
1982).
162. 477 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 247 (citation omitted).
164. 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
165. Id. at 1004. This requirement would entail physician testimony that periodic
testing is recommended.
166. Id. at 1003.
167. 596 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1993).
168. Id. at 69-70. " :
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gible for monitoring under federal regulations, 69 the court focused on
whether a worker's claim for medical monitoring costs was barred by
New York's Workers' Compensation Law. 170 The appellate court, cit-
ing New York's Workers' Compensation Law, reversed the trial
court's denial of the company's motion for, summary judgment. The
New York law bars workers' suits against their employer for work-
related injury, even if recovery is not available from the Workers'
Compensation program.,171 The court noted, however, that section
thirteen of the Workers' Compensation Law provided compensation
even if the worker is not disabled;1 72 accordingly, the court suggested
that, if this particular issue had been brought before the court, New
York's Workers' Compensation program would cover claims in this
particular case. Significantly, the court's acceptance in Acevedo of the
validity of claims for medical monitoring costs indicated that the
Fourth Department's view was accepted in the First Department.
The recent action filed by Advocates for Children against the New
York City Board of Education relies on this New York caselaw. 17 3
The suit suggests that medical monitoring can be "provided" or "fi-
nanced" by the defendant, options that have only recently been devel-
oped in the literature, 74 and are worth noting in a reconsideration of
AHERA. Local health departments operate a number of health pro-
grams for children, often in conjunction with the school system. The
most notable are vaccination programs, hearing and vision testing, and
in New York City, lead screening. The provision of a monitoring pro-
gram for schoolchildren in improperly inspected school buildings or in
169. Id. at 70 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1001[l], 1926.58 (federal regulations setting
standards for asbestos exposure)).
170. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1992). The law states that Workers'
Compensation "shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to
such employee." (emphasis added). The trial court in Acevedo denied the company's
summary judgment motion and allowed the workers to sue since it felt medical moni-
toring costs, recognized in New York, would be barred under Workers' Compensation
as no disability occurred. Acevedo, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 71-72.
171. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 10-11 (McKinney 1992). Although the statute
generally bars workers from suing employers for work-related injuries, workers may
still sue employers for injuries arising from the intentional torts of employers.
172. 596 N.Y.S.2d at 72: "[Under N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 13,] there is no re-
quirement that an employee establish that he or she lost wages as a result of the injury
... disability may be found to commence 'at the time of physical impairment or need
of medical care and before any loss of wages.'" (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)). 1 , 1
173. Advocates For Children of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., No. CV-93 4269
(E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 1993).
174. Id. For an excellent review of alternative remedies in cases where toxic expo-
sure leaves no current injury, but may entail future medical monitoring (e.g., medical
checkups, blood tests, lung studies, etc.), see Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical
Monitoring Funds: the Periodic Payment of Future Medical Surveillance Expenses in
Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661 (1992) (discussing alternatives to the
traditional lump sum remedy in these cases and favoring the minority rules of periodic
payment and direct service provision in cases presenting possible future injury; one
example is a clinic operated by a nuclear power plant pursuant to possible exposure).
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school buildings known to have had friable asbestos has not been dis-
cussed at any point in the New York City school asbestos controversy.
In other potential "toxic tort" situations, health programs have been
employed as remedies.'75 Health programs offer the opportunity to
collect epidemiological data which can expand the expertise of admin-
istrative agencies in assessing future harms. 76 Such opportunity is
lost when monetary damages are awarded and no further contact with
the claimant is required.
Such "direct service provision" remedies discourage litigation since
they do not present a lump sum award from which attorneys can draw
a handsome contingency fee. For this reason, potentially impacted
parties may find it difficult to obtain qualified representation. An ad-
ministrative approach employing a direct service provision remedy
would therefore need to add a quick, easily understood complaint pro-
cess that would reduce the need for costly legal representation. While
AHERA does have a citizen complaint provision, 77 it is applied to
situations where a person seeks to initiate an investigation of a school
building. AHERA's civil penalty provisions do not benefit children's
current needs. They also do not have the same deterrence factor as
conventional fines since the "wrongdoer" is a public agency whose
professional and ethical sympathies usually lie in concert with the
child anyway."'7 Damages and relief are left to tort-related court ac-
tions. Expansion of this provision to include a hearing process, in
which an educational agency may provide services to schoolchildren in
lieu of, or in addition to, the civil penalties outlined in AHERA,
would more directly affect the harms to children from asbestos
exposure.
To let the courts know when a party can leave the administrative
process and proceed to the courts, this improvement in AHERA must
be accompanied by a more thorough explanation of primary jurisdic-
tion, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and judicial review. Cur-
rently, there is no administrative process for remedying the effects of
asbestos on schoolchildren, and relief is up to the courts. AHERA
specifies that, "[i]t is not the intent of Congress that this subchapter
... be interpreted as influencing, in either the plaintiff's or defend-
ant's favor, the disposition of any civil action for damages relating to
175. Blumenberg, supra note 174, at 707.
176. Id. But see Leah Beth Ward, Now, Lifetime Medical Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1994, § 3, Financial Desk, at 21 ("Medical monitoring bothers defense law-
yers because it generates epidemiological data that could substantiate future tort
actions. .. ").
177. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(d).
178. This contrasts with a for-profit organization where there may be direct pecuni-
ary profit in violating a given regulation. AHERA provides for penalties to be depos-
ited into an Asbestos Trust Fund, 15 U.S.C. § 2647(a), but this fund is dedicated to
buildings, not persons, 20 U.S.C § 4022.
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asbestos."' 7 9 The AHERA hearing should be a setting where the ex-
pertise of the agency can be used to develop a factual record; judicial
review would only cover errors in the law, rather than the facts. A
broad preemption provision covering state laws relating to school as-
bestos, going beyond consultant regulations and covering this area, is
needed to prevent inconsistent findings by courts.
Primary jurisdiction is one method of comity between courts and
administrative agencies that prevents premature judicial interference
in a dispute. Typically, the doctrine arises when a plaintiff seeks relief
from the courts in the absence of any administrative proceedings. Pri-
mary jurisdiction of a dispute in an administrative agency is favored
when promoting uniformity is desired.'8 0 However, a key issue in
vesting primary jurisdiction on an administrative agency is relief avail-
ability. If the agency cannot give the relief that the plaintiff seeks,
then the administrative process is a needless waste of time.'8 ' Thus,
vesting primary jurisdiction in an administrative agency is valid when
the agency has the expertise to resolve disputes and can fashion
relief.A8 2
Undoubtedly, the school asbestos situation lends itself to vesting
primary jurisdiction with the EPA. First, the EPA has the expertise to
resolve disputes in the field due to the significant research it has con-
ducted. Second, since medical monitoring, as shown below, is an un-
certain remedy (not recognized at all in some jurisdictions), the EPA
could provide some uniformity in the area. Third, the EPA has
demonstrated, in the consultant regulation situation, that it has be-
come the de facto pervasive authority in the area of school asbestos,
even by the most aggressive state regulatory systems. Fourth,
AHERA gives the EPA the ability to penalize school districts.183
However, such penalties have a limit of $5000 per day; this may need
revision to reflect the costs of medical monitoring. Ideally, the pen-
alty could be revised in favor of an insurance program which spreads
the cost of a medical monitoring program. It would be necessary to
revise AHERA's current "no preemption" clause and replace it with a
preemption and a preclusion clause. When relief is uncertain, such
changes would force dispute resolution out of the tort arena into a less
expensive one.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 2649(e).
180. Feldspar Trucking Co. v. Greater At. Shippers Ass'n, 683 F. Supp. 1375, 1377
(N.D. Ga. 1987).
181. Compare Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that
plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing action in
courts) with Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1977) (hold-
ing that pursuing relief in courts is justified without exhausting administrative reme-
dies if administrative process cannot provide relief). Klicker is generally regarded as
the better view. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 121, at 535.
182. SCHWARTZ, supra note 121, at 538.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 2647(a), (c).
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Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, "no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."'18 4
However, as is the case with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a
plaintiff may go to court directly if relief from administrative agencies
is unavailable or would be futile. 185 Other grounds for avoiding the
exhaustion requirement would be if the agency is partial, the agency is
acting beyond its power, or the remaining questions are questions of
law and not of fact.186 This last exception to the exhaustion require-
ment is problematic since tort law on medical monitoring varies across
jurisdictions. A much stronger AHERA, with a preclusion clause re-
flecting the reality of the federalization of school asbestos, would
serve to guide courts that relief is to be found with the agency, not the
courts.
A preclusion clause in AHERA must deal with the existing rule
that provides a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
agency determinations.8 7 "Final" EPA determinations may not be fi-
nal.' 88 The recent case of Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment 89 established that "final" can mean that facts are finalized by
the administrative process, but conclusions of law can still be appealed
in the courts. This may not be as problematic as it appears. An addi-
tional preemption clause, indicating that AHERA supersedes other
law in the area of school asbestos, would provide guidance to courts as
to what law to apply. The prevailing view, that courts give deference
to an agency's factual determinations that are supported by substan-
tial evidence,19 indicates that agency determinations will be adhered
to unless unless the record evidence indicates they are patently
unreasonable.' 9 '
184. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (citing Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)).
185. A pithy statement of this exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, and one that is often quoted by courts, can be found in Orion Corp.
v. State, 693 P.2d 1369, 1378 (Wash. 1985) (excusing further administrative proceed-
ings and allowing party to go to court when further administrative proceedings would
be like "pump[ing] oil from a dry hole").
186. SCHWARTZ, supra note 121, at 547-57..
187. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
188. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (immigration statute that made
agency determinations "final" only referred to the end of the administrative process
and did not block access to courts).
189. 470 U.S. 768 (1985).
190. SCHWARTZ, supra note 121, at 637.
191. Id. at 640, stating:
When is an agency finding unfair? That is the case when the finding is not a
reasonable one in light of the evidence in the whole record. Substantial evi-
dence is such evidence as might lead a reasonable person to make a finding.
The evidence in support of a fact-finding is substantial when from it an infer-
ence of existence of the fact may be drawn reasonably. In such a case, the
reviewing court must uphold the finding, even if it would have drawn a con-
trary inference from the evidence. Id. (citations omitted).
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Medical monitoring costs and other environmentally-related health
costs were not specifically addressed in any of the recent health re-
form proposals.192 An all-inclusive health program, if ever adopted,
may be all the more reason for a federal approach to claims for medi-
cal monitoring arising out of school asbestos. Such health proposals
serve to spread the costs of medical monitoring over a wider economic
base and make relief more obtainable than is usual in the tort process.
CONCLUSION
The New York City school asbestos controversy illustrates that
AHERA has two weaknesses. The statute's consultant requirements,
worded as a "floor" for states to develop stricter requirements, has
instead become the "floor and ceiling" standard for the states. The
EPA can easily remedy this by utilizing the rulemaking powers
granted to it under the statute. More importantly, AHERA should be
amended to include an administrative process where citizens directly
impacted by improperly inspected and abated school buildings can ob-
tain prompt resolution of their medical monitoring claims. Such a
process would recognize that schoolchildren will be the last litigants in
the asbestos litigation saga and should not be denied meaningful re-
lief. This is especially true since local health departments, allied with
local school systems, are in a position to directly provide the medical
monitoring services needed by the child.
192. As of January 1, 1993, there were seven major health' reform bills before
Congress:
1. S. 1757, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (the Administration proposal,
also known as The Health Security Act).
2. S. 491, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (another Democratic proposal
sponsored by Reps. McDermott and Conyers in the House and Sen. Wellstone
in the Senate, also known as The American Health Security Act).
3. S. 1770, H.R. 3704, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (a Republican proposal, spon-
sored by Rep. Thomas and Sen. Chafee, also known as The Health Equity and
Access Reform Today Act).
4. S. 1533, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (another Republican proposal,
sponsored by Sen. Lott and Rep. Michel, also known as The Affordable Health
Care Now Act).
5. S. 1743, H.R. 3698, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (a third Republican proposal,
sponsored by Sen. Nickels and Rep. Stearns, also known as The Consumer
Choice Health Security Act).
6. H.R. 3918, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (a fourth Republican proposal, spon-
sored by Rep. Armey in the House with a Senate counterpart to be sponsored
by Sen. Gramm, also known as The Comprehensive Family Health Access and
Savings Act).
7. S. 1579, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1stSess. (1993) (a bipartisan bill sponsored by
Reps. Cooper and Grandy in the House and Sen. Breaux in the Senate, also
known as the 'Managed Competition Act).
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